The Women's Quota in Conflict Ridden Sudan:
Ideological Battles for and against Gender Equality Introduction
This article explores women's substantive representation in Sudan's National Assembly. increase of female parliamentarians in the country's National and State Assemblies of which the overwhelming majority were from the Islamist state party, NCP.
Our findings suggest that the strategy of Islamist women within the government is to work inside the gender machinery of the state, but in doing so they are largely bypassing the National Assembly. Female legislators have not even been able to initiate a parliamentary debate on law reforms suggested by Islamist state organizations, institutions and ministries because they are weary of confrontation with conservatives in the National Assembly. During the CPA period, the quota itself stands out as the only legislative accomplishment thus far, partly because women's mobilization for the quota took place across party lines and ideological boundaries and partly because the initiative was not met by a counter-mobilization by the religiously conservative elements. The article highlights polarization rather than cooperation between women activists and women in the government as an important factor in explaining the lack of legislative accomplishments and debates. The NCP has succeeded in creating rift between women activists and women in government and this has weakened the opportunities for a strong and independent women's movement. The governmentalization of women's rights combined with an increasingly polarized political setting where the President, with an arrest order hanging over his head from the International Criminal Court (ICC), is seeking support from conservative elements inside and outside NCP, the article argues that this limits the possibilities for a reform of Sudan's laws.
The article attempts to contribute to the literature explaining why women parliamentarians in some countries have succeeded and others have failed in passing legislation to advance women's rights across Africa parliaments (see for example Muriaas and Wang 2012 , Waylen 2007 , Britton 2005 , Burnet 2008 Powley and Pearson 2007) . Bauer and Britton (2006) highlight several sub-Saharan African cases where women legislators have had a positive impact on institutional cultures within parliaments, on legislation and on civil society. National women's movements and organizations (often with links to a global feminist movement) is identified by many as crucial in ensuring that women's legislators promote an agenda in which women's issues are prominent (Tripp et.al 2009; Tamale 2000 , Weldon 2002a , Weldon 2002b , Htun and Weldon 2010 . According to Htun and Weldon (2012: 560) , "a strong, autonomous feminist movement is both substantively and statistically significant as a predictor of government action to redress violence against women". Tripp (2008: 68) highlights the autonomy of the women's movement in Uganda as critical to its success. Disney (2006: 31) says that in the reform of the family law in Mozambique, female legislators were able to work closely with women activists to push for a progressive version of the law. In sum, the literature put emphasis on the autonomy and independence of women's movements coupled with women's ability to form broad coalitions across political parties, ethnic, and religious divides.
In explaining why broad and sustainable coalitions are not made between female legislators and women activists, several factors are mentioned in the literature including patronage politics, patriarchal norms, social authoritarianism, and parliamentarians' professionalization while in office (Britton 2005 , Bauer and Britton 2006 , Sater 2012 . This article highlights competing gender ideologies between women activists demanding gender equality (musawah) and female legislators calling for gender equity (insaf) as an additional factor in authoritarian Sudan. The Sudanese government has successfully polarizied the two groups' positions between a "Westernized" and foreign stance on Sudanese womanhood emphasizing equality versus an "Islamic" and authentic stance on womanhood emphasizing equity. The government sidelines women activists as "Westernized" as they call for the ratification of international conventions and solidarity with a global feminist movement; deeming 'feminism' and claims to gender equality alien to Sudanese culture and society. This is partly cause by the fact that women activists embed their claim for gender equality in a broader call for democracy and human rights which threatens the foundation of the increasingly authoritarian regime. They refuse to cooperate with the government out of fear to give their autocratic rule legitimacy. 
From Conflict to Peace: Opportunities Missed for Sudanese

Women?
Although there is considerable variation across Africa, the most significant advances with regards to women-friendly legislation has been made in post-conflict states covering a range of regime types, according to Bauer and Britton (2006 : 11, see also Tripp et.al 2009 . Waylen (2007 , referring to South Africa, suggests that the political opportunity structure provided by a political transition opens up new possibilities for women. She suggests it was critical that there were opportunities in the reconstitution of post-Apartheid South Africa for women to make a difference. During the transition, women built a broad coalition with more than 100 women's organizations which laid the basis for future legislative changes (Britton 2005) . The end of armed conflicts in various countries has opened up new windows of opportunity for the mobilization of women and allowed them the chance to take part in the processes of constitution and lawmaking (Bauer et.al 2006) .
Sudan is a particularly interesting case considering the fact that other post-conflict states have seen particularly significant advances (Tripp et.al 2009 Rights of Men and Women that "the equal rights of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights and all social, cultural and economic rights, including the right of equal pay for equal work, shall be ensured". Although women did not participate in drafting the constitution, they put it on the political agenda Women from various political parties discussed the draft constitution and wrote a memo where they urged the final version to be gender sensitive (Badri 2003) .
In the wake of the CPA, women activists have particularly been preoccupied with law reform in an attempt to cease the moment that the equality clauses in the Interim National
Constitution (2005) were not able to build a broad and sustainable coalition and remained fragmented throughout the post-CPA period. According to Balghis Badri at Ahfad University for Women, "the Sudanese women's movement do not take advantage of the right times of history. Like after the popular revolution in 1985, we signed the convention for political and civil rights, but not CEDAW. We missed our chance". 4 Sudan, together with the U.S, Somalia and Iran, has not ratified the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
The large international presence in the country following the peace agreement made available resources to advance women's rights. The women's movement has not been dormant before the CPA, but the new windows of opportunity offered by the peace agreement created a space for mobilization and action (Itto 2006 ). After the war ended, there was an explosion of NGOs;
Sudan has never seen so many NGOs working within the field of gender and women's rights as after the CPA (Ahfad University for Women 2012). The international presence offered Sudanese activists capacity building, funding to establish NGOs and run programs and exposed them to activists in the region and globally working to better the situation of women within a range of areas like for example political representation and peacebuilding.
At the same time as the post-CPA period opened up for the mobilization of women, it also saw the emergence of other forces which used this new space to forward views to limit rather than expand women's rights. Among these forces is Salafism prominent, a conservative including women activists, are facing restrictions. 5 To give one recent example, members of a youth group called Girifna which translates into "we are fed up" are facing charges of terrorism. 6 Girifna was one of many groups which demonstrated against the government last year in what was an attempt to follow Egypt and Tunisia in ousting the government. The government successfully suppressed the "Arab spring" in Sudan. President Bashir said to the protesters "those who expect an Arab Spring will not see it because Sudan has a hot summer that will burn its enemies and grill them". 7 The president has also stated that the new constitution will serve " as a template to those around us. And our template is clear, a 100 percent Islamic constitution, without communism or secularism or Western (influences)".
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There is widespread discontent, not only from the political opposition but from Islamists themselves.
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Women's Mobilization for the Quota: Broad Coalition for Women's
Political Representation
The 25% women's quota came about through a broad mobilization of Sudanese women. It is based on the experience of continuous low representation that Sudanese women in the country's elected and appointed parliaments throughout post-independence, that they saw the need for it (Badri 2007 (Badri , 2008 . 10 Although the initiative for the quota originated in civil society, it did not meet much resistance among Islamist women within NCP, mainly because it is regarded as in line with the party's gender ideology. Both Islamists and women activists and politicians mobilized for the quota together. They advocated a 30% women's quota for which most political parties agreed. They referred to the 2005Constitution as the primary national legal framework, particularly emphasizing article 32 (2) stating that "the State shall promote woman rights through affirmative action". The fact that they were able to mobilize together, was identified as crucial for its success by the actors involved. According to a woman advocate for the quota, Samira Mahdi from the Democratic Union Party;
"the mobilization for the quota was successful because we were organized and united in our advocacy strategy. We met all political leaders to guarantee their support. In addition, we organized demonstrations to the parliament and these had wide media converge" Eventually, the 2008 Election Law was passed in the National Assembly with a reserved quota for in the country's National and State Assemblies. 14 112 (25%) would be filled through separate and closed women's lists. 15 The form the quota took was regarded by many women activists as giving political parties little incentives to nominate them in 'core' geographical constituencies or party lists (Abbas 2010: 105) . The biggest accomplishment of the quota was how it came about, namely through a broad mobilization of women across ethnic, religious, ideological and party lines.
The high hopes and expectations from women activists to the legal changes the quota would bring for women, was replaced with disappointment during the 2010 elections.The SPLM was rather uninterested in the national election and focused on the southern states in preparation for the referendum and later the secession of South Sudan. The NCP used state resources for its campaigns while constraining and restricting other political parties from access to resources and media. Major political parties in opposition boycotted the elections altogether.
The Islamists therefore won the overwhelming majority of the seats reserved for women in the northern states; only two seats were won by SPLM and one from the Umma Federal Party.
This meant that the National Assembly after the secession of the South does not represent a diversity of political parties or women's voices, but is largely dominated by the NCP.
Competing Gender Ideologies: Female Legislators and Women
Activists standing against each other
The dominant gender ideology represented in the National Parliament is the one advocated by the ruling party; an Islamist ideology emphasizing the principle of equity (insaf). Equity within an Islamic frame emphasizes piety, distinguishing it from equality, which they consider Western and secular and thereby irrelevant to Muslim Sudanese society. Although the female legislators elected to the National Assembly are not pro-equality in terms of women's rights, does not mean they cannot initiate legislation in women's interest in areas such as FGM, maternal mortality, and education within the paradigm of equity. As rightly pointed out by Celis and Childs (2011) substantive representation of women does not equal the feminist substantive representation of women. We do not regard Islamist women in a perspective rendering them some sort of false consciousness, but we do acknowledge that our analysis "is embedded in feminist theory" (Dahlerup 2009:10) . We are cognizant of the fact that female legislators in African parliaments "have an agenda that is demonstrably broader" than those in Western parliaments, including poverty reduction and HIV/AIDS (Bauer and Britton 2006) . 16 In this article, we look more narrowly at law reform; mainly because it has been identified by both women in government and by women activist as important in the post-CPA period. In the words of Attiyat Mustafa, the head of the Violence against Women's Unit and a member of parliament for the NCP; "this is an era of law reform". Not surprisingly, the interviews conducted for this study suggest that overall gender equality is not a policy priority for the female legislators in the National Assembly. This is demonstrated in their rejection of CEDAW, which they deem of no relevance to Sudanese society. In the words of female legislators both in the present and in the previous National Assembly, it stands "against Sharia law. Specifically article 16 which refers to absolute equality between men and women" 18 ; "CEDAW conflicts with our religion"; 19 But women's participation in political and public life is conditioned upon a certain type of Islamic dress and moral behaviour. Nageeb and others point out that the "woman question"
has served as a driving vessel in the political project labelled "the civilization project" by the Islamist stakeholders (Nageeb 2004; Hale 1997; Al-Bashir 2003) . The centrality of "family" to the Islamist political project as it has been codified in state laws is closely related to control of women's dress, interaction with men outside the family and behaviour in public spaces, including educational institutions and work places, but also spaces of leisure, and even the streets and public transportation (Nageeb 2004) . . 23 One of the laws which are supported by female legislators is the Khartoum Public Order Act (1996) which stipulates the modest dress of women and the proper moral behavior of men and women in public spaces. In the words of a female legislator: "I fully support the public order act as it is needed to monitor women dress and discipline men's and women's interaction in public". 24 Interviews demonstrate that emerging reformist voices within NCP. One of the issues in the current family law that is a concern to most of the Islamist women is early marriage. In the 1991 law a judge can affirm a marriage for a minor of ten years amending prior legal marriage age of eighteen years (Fluehr-Lobban 2012: 139 The arguments used by Islamist women inside and outside of the National Assembly for abolishing the practice of child marriages relates to reducing maternal mortality rates and also increasing women's participation in both education and in the labor force. According to Attiyat Mustafa, who by most is regarded as a conservative, "the family law is perfect except for the early marriage. We need to decide what the proper age of marriage is. Now it is 10".
26
On early marriage it seems like even the conservative female members of the National Assembly and women in the NCP more generally see the need for a minor reform.
Samia Hassan Sidahmed, who is the leader of the women's parliamentarian caucus and a member of parliament from NCP, admits the need for minor legal reforms of the family law but says that "we cannot do it in parliament" (quoted in Tønnessen and Kjøstvedt 2010: 22) .
She says further that they have to work outside the National Assembly to initiate reform. This In many ways, they seem to grow more conservative the very moment they enter the halls of the National Assembly. This mirrors the limitations by party patronage put forward in the general literature (See for example Muriaas and Wang 2012, Bauer and Britton 2006) . They have been put in "positions of recipients of political favors" to the NCP and the president (Sater 2012: 73) . While in parliament, the women therefore perform loyalty to the NCP and the president. In the words of an Islamist female minister, "you do not want to rock the chair you sit in". 28 If women from the NCP step outside of the ideological limits, they risk marginalization. In the words of a civil society actor; "the Islamist women themselves risk being attacked by their own party members if they start listening to the women activists". The Islamist women are well aware that the Salafists in particular will mobilize against them.
They are concerned about the growing influence of these forces. Their strategy is toemphasize the Islamic perspective trying to get the conservatives to embrace the concept of law reform in itself; among those conservatives are also some female legislators within the National Assembly. According to an Islamists women heavily involved in the law review processes:
"Islam is not the problem. It is very civilized. It is a beautiful religion for women. But the extremists, the Salafists, are against the concept of law reform. They say Islamic law is the Quran and Sunna and it cannot be changed. We are throwing a stone in stagnant water. We will meet resistance. Some sections of society are against it". To work within the area of FGM awareness and eradication has not been considered a particularly sensitive area of intervention, at least compared with sexual and domestic violence and the family law, because leading Islamists like Hasan al-Turabi has spoken out against the practice and has not circumcised his daughters. But with the initiatives to criminalize it, conservative forces within NCP and Salafists started to mobilize against it using Islamic arguments. Although they stand against the pharaonic version (infibulation with excision), they advocate the Sunna form (clitoridectomy) using religious arguments. The events are described by an interviewee closely involved in the process in the following manner:
"We attempted to insert an article, article 13, in the National Child Law.
But it was dropped by the President. He was under pressure from the ICC.
He started to talk to the Salafists who advocate the Sunna circumcision.
They say it is Islamic. Against this backdrop, the criminalization of FGM was portrayed as an intrusion from the West; That the National Council for "We are challenging the dominant discourse. We have a clarity of who we are and what we want, namely gender equality. We have had a greater exposure to women's experiences in the world. The previous movement did not challenge the discourse. We are doing that now. By "we" I mean the progressive movement who believe in gender equality and believe in equality more generally".
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While some activists are secular at heart and others have an Islamic basis, they employ religious arguments to argue for law reform to foster women's equal rights. This is partly a pragmatic move to counter the government attempts to sideline them as "Western" and thus foreign to Sudanese culture whereby they try to abolish the distinction between opposition to the state and opposition to Islam. It is also partly an Islamic feminist project which genuinely believes that gender equality is part and parcel of the religious sources.
They thus try to detach gender equality with its wrongful association with Western domination and situate it within Islam itself. As pointed out by Samia Hashmi, a female lawyer and activist, "Women have become critical symbols between Islam and the West. But what the government is practicing is not Islam, it is oppression". 37 As such, the international dimension has reinforced the polarization between the two positions rather than enabled a dialogue and common platform between women across political parties and ideological divides.
Family law is a major focus in their advocacy work embedded in a fundamental rejection of the notion of qawama. As in other countries in Africa and beyond (Htun et. al 2011) women activists the 1991 law is built on a philosophy that "women are less than men" and it therefore needs a radical reform that eradicates the principle of qawama it builds on, not a minor one which continues to support a view that women are under the guardianship of men.
38 While the government do not want to support initiatives taken in civil society, women activists principally do not support the law reform process run by Islamist women. In fact they are concerned that this law reform is only initiated to point out the discrepancies between the Interim National Constitution and the laws, so that they can take away the gender equality clauses in the new "100 % Islamic constitution". They are therefore facing an unpredictable legal map. Since Sudan has not ratified CEDAW, activist argue, they can potentially lose their main legal framework for advocating change.
Women activists are largely excluded from the formal law review processes initiated by the government. The lack of influence of women outside NCP on those inside it is striking (Abbas 2010: 107) . As many interviewees say, women are working against each other rather than with each other to push for a reform. 39 In the words of Fahima Hashim from Salmmah Center, the consequence is that "there is no coherent women's movement in Sudan. We are operating from isolated islands". 40 Competing ideologies are given as a major reason for this.
According to Samia Nihar, "there is a clear division among women along ideological lines". 41 Particularly the government's rejection of CEDAW is fore fronted as a source of continued division between the two groups. In the words of an activist, "CEDAW is like the devil to them. Instead of moving forward, this regime has taken us backward". 42 The ideological division is not only embedded in gender, but also in a broader call for democracy and human rights. While law reform within the area of women's rights does not directly threaten an increasingly autocratic state, calls for freedom and multiparty rule does.
Women activists are largely (but not entirely) overlapping with members of oppositional political parties. This makes it difficult for reformist women in the government to reach out for support in civil society because women activists are so strongly demanding the end of the regime in which they are participating. They refuse to cooperate with the government out of fear to give their authoritarian rule legitimacy. According to Asha al-Karib "the government is against human rights. (…) We are dealing with a one party government which stands against women's rights. It is a tough job." 43 This confrontational line mirrors that of the oppositional political parties who decline to take part in the constitution-making processes initiated by the government unless the president guarantees that it is a genuinely inclusive invitation aimed at political reform. They refuse, because they are afraid that the Bashir will force through his '100% Islamic constitution' no matter what while wrongfully presenting it to the public as an outcome of an inclusive process
Women activist thus see their work during the post-CPA period as preparation for when this regime will fall, more than an attempt to try to influence its policies. According to Balghis
Badri at Ahfad University for Women;
"Women know where and how to make pressure when there is a regime change. Now we are present in all spheres (…).Although this regime is oppressive, there have never been so many women NGOs and never been so much awareness. There is more engagement. We have had more exposure to the international community; we have started to learn and see; we have started to mature during this repressive regime. We are ready!".
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Conclusion
The article argues that the competing gender ideologies and consequent polarization between women activist and women in National Assembly limit the possibilities for a broad coalition and subsequent united pressure for a reform of Sudan's laws. The current government has succeeded in creating an ideological rift between women activists and women in government and this has weakened the opportunities for a strong and independent women's movement, something which several scholars identify as crucial for legislative assertion within the area of violence against women. This article contributes to the scholarly debate by emphasizing competing gender ideologies in explaining why female legislators in Sudan have failed in initiating and passing legislation to advance women's rights. This ideological divide weakens the reformists working from within the government to initiate reform, because they cannot rely on the backing, support and broad mobilization of women to push, lobby and make a roar in media, the streets and inside and outside the National Assembly. The fact that they were able to do this in the mobilization for the quota itself, demonstrates that they are successful when they work in tandem. The quota was a rare occasion during the current regime, when women activists and women in government have mobilized together across ethnic, religious, ideological and political divides. The only other occasion this broad mobilization took place during the last 23 years of Islamist rule was when the governor of Khartoum. Magzoub al-Khalifa Ahma, issued a decree in 2001 banning women from working in services rendering direct service to men like restaurants, petrol stations etc. According to the governor, women's morality was compromised when they rendered direct service to men, and this improper behavior was not in accordance with Islam. Women activists and Islamist women came together, organized demonstrations and eventually took the decree to the constitutional court.
They resisted this attempt to restrict their presence in the public sphere, arguing successfully that it limited women's exercise of their constitutional right to work They won the case and the decree was deemed unconstitutional .
The article demonstrates further that "feminist pressure alone does not suffice; there must be openings, needs, or elective affinities with the state" (Htun and Weldon 2011: 4) . At the same time as the peace agreement opened up for the mobilization of Sudanese women, it also saw the emergence of other forces which used this new space to forward views to limit rather than expand women's rights. The results of these negotiations depend on patterns of state building, showing that Islam is not only a constraint (Creevey 2006 ), but also offers a possible framework for the expansion of women's rights in Sudan.
